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The term contagion2 is generally used to refer to the spread3 of market shocks 
from one country to another. However, identifying what is meant by contagion and 
its consequences has become in recent years a literature in itself4, given the 
importance of such consequences on economies all over the world. 
 
Despite the lack of theoretical consensus,  some authors try to measure 
contagion through the use of correlation tests. The aim of my work is to raise a 
technical and conceptual critique concerning these models. To support my 
concerns I provide a broad vision and background of contagion literature and an 
insight in the particular field of contagion correlation test. 
 
 The work is organized in four parts. Firstly,  an overview of definitional issues 
concerning contagion, as presented in the literature, is explained together with the 
different crisis transmission channels that authors have identified. Secondly, a 
detailed description of the contagion correlation test –as the most common means 
to search for contagion—is presented, giving a full overview of the models used in 
the literature. Thirdly,  I will express my concerns about the test and the models of 






                                                 
2 Contagion is an epidemiology term, which defines a mathematical theory that helps to predict the course of an 
infection of a illness. 
3 Notion that financial trouble is capable of spreading like a contagious disease. 





2.Contagion and Categories of crisis propagation. 
Episodes of volatility in international capital markets have occurred many times 
in recent history5 but the issue of financial contagion did not summon the 
attention of policymakers and economists until the East Asian crisis. 
The most popular6 definition of contagion identifies it as a significant increase 
in cross-market linkages after a shock to one country (or group of countries) –as 
measured by the degree to which asset prices or financial flows move together 
across markets— relative to these comovements in tranquil times. The size of these 
comovements have led many economists to raise the question of whether ‘tranquil 
periods’ and ‘crises’ are different regimes in the international transmission of 
financial shocks7. 
The possibility of such discontinuities is a concern for both investors –because 
diversification of international portfolios may fail to deliver just when its benefits 
are most needed— and policymakers8 --because excessive financial comovements 
may spread a country-specific shock to other economies, even when these have 
better fundamentals, triggering recession and devastating countries around the 
world. 
 
Crisi transmission can  be conceptually divided into two categories 9. 
The first category, “Fundamentals-based contagion”10, involves spillovers that 
result from the normal interdependence among market economies due to real and 
                                                 
5 1989 Japon,1992-3 Central Europe, 1994 Mexico, 1997 Asia,1998 Russia and 1999Brazil. 
6 Calvo(1999), Calvo and Mendoza (2000), Caramazza et al. (2000), Claessens et al. (2001),Corsetti et al. (2000a), 
Edwards (1998), Eichengreen et al. (1996), IMF (1998 and 1999), Jeanne and Masson (1998), Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (2000), Kaminsky and Schmukler (1999), Kodres and Pritsker (2002), and Schinasi and Smith (2001). 
7 Cosetti and Sbracia(2002) 
8 “Japan, Europe and the United States agree on this: we are on the eve of a new financial architecture” (Gerhard 
Schröder speach, Bloomberg News,  January 20, 1999) “..it is now time for the world to take the next steps of 
implementing a new financial architecture and long-term reform of the global financial system. This should 
include steps to reduce the entire financial system’s vulnerability to rapid capital flows...” (Bill Clinton 
speach,Market News International, April 20, 1999). 
9 Masson1998;Wolf1999;Forbes and Rigobon2000;Pritsker 2000 and Karolyi 2002. 




financial linkages. These forms of comovements would not normally be defined as 
contagion. 
The fundamental causes that drive these comovements are of two main types.  
-Macro or Common factors, such as major economic shifts in industrial countries 
or a shock to commodity prices, can trigger crises in or large capital flows into or 
out of markets. 
-Micro or Local shocks that can be transmitted by several channels: 
1.  Trade Links. Any major trading partner of a country in which a financial 
crisis has lead to a currency depreciation could experience declining 
asset prices and large capital outflows, or become the target of a 
speculative attack.  
2.  Competitive devaluation. Devaluation in a country hit by a crisis reduces 
the export competitiveness of the countries with which it competes in 
third markets.  A game of competitive devaluation can be triggered, 
leading to a greater currency depreciation than that required by any 
initial deterioration in fundamentals11.  
3.  Financial link. The spread of a crisis depends on the degree of financial 
market integration12. A financial crisis in one country can lead to direct 
financial effects (reductions in trade credits, foreign direct investment, 
and other capital flows abroad) in other countries. 
 
The second category of contagion, “irrational contagion”, emphasizes the   
comovements unaccounted for by  global or micro shocks (interdependence) as 
detailed above. It is assumed to be solely the result of the behaviour of investors or 
                                                 
11 Corsetti and others (1999), 
12 The higher the degree of integration, the more extensive could be the contagious effects to another country and 
vice versa Countries that are not financially integrated, because of capital controls or lack of access to 
international financing, are immune to contagion. In this sense, financial markets facilitate the transmission of 




other financial agents and is associated with financial panics, herd behaviour, loss 
of confidence, and incrased risk aversion. 
The literature differs on the scope of rational versus irrational investor behaviour, 
both individually and collectively13. To clarify this, a classification of types of 
investor behaviour and their consequences is useful: 
 
- “Investors practices”: Investors behaving rationally can take actions that are ex 
ante individually rational but that lead to excessive comovements.  These also can 
be sorted by the problems they address: 
1.  Liquidity problems: Market crash in one country can induce investors to sell 
off securities in other markets to raise cash (in anticipation of a higher 
frequency of redemptions). If banks experience a marked deterioration in the 
quality of their loans to one country, they may attempt to reduce the overall 
risk of their loan portfolios by reducing their exposure to other high-risk 
investments elsewhere. 
2. Incentive problems: An initial crisis may induce investors to sell off their 
holdings in other countries because of their tendency to maintain certain 
proportions of a country’s or a region’s stock in their portfolios. As a result, 
asset markets in a range of economies may lose value, and the currencies of 
these economies may depreciate significantly. The value-at-risk models 
explain why banks and investors may find it optimal to sell most high-risk 
assets when a shock affects one of such assets14.  
3.  Information asymmetries and coordination problems. If a crisis reveals weak 
fundamentals, investors may rationally conclude that similarly situated 
countries are also likely to face such problems, and then they will attack 
                                                 
13 Pritsker 2000 




their currencies. This is based on the assumption  that investors often do 
not know the conditions of every single country due to the high cost of 
country-specific information. As financial investors can be divided into 
“Informed” investors and “Uninformed” investors, and as the the latter   
follow the investment patterns of the former, the existence of these 
information asymmetries can lead to herd behaviour15. The tendency to herd 
together can increase with, firstly, the number of countries in which 
investments can be placed and, secondly, the range of investors 
4.  Changes in the international financial system, or in the rules of the game,  
which can induce investors to alter their behaviour after an initial crisis. A 
common example is that a default in the debt of one country increases fears 
that other countries might follow similar unilateral policies regarding foreign 
private creditors. 
 
- Multiple equilibria contagion, as a consequence of sudden shifts in market 
expectations and investors confidence.  An intuitive example arises when a crisis in 
one market causes another market economy to move to a adverse equilibrium16. 
The result would be a sudden withdrawal of funds from this second country by 
investors concerned that delayed action may forfeit their claim to a stake in the 
limited pool of foreign exchange reserves.  
 
Empirical literature on the evidence of contagion has been abundant in the last 
8 years. Additionally, potential reforms of the international financial architecture, 
intended to avoid this contagion, are being discussed, as yet without settlement. 
The multiple approaches to the topic, the great variety of tests applied, as well as 
                                                 
1515 Calvo and Mendoza (forthcoming) 




the different outcomes for the same periods depending on the methodology used, 
have made a summary close to impossible17.  
I will provide a detailed explanation of the “Correlation of asset prices or exchange 
rates test” in the next section, since it is the most important and common 
approach to the topic.  
 
3.Contagion and correlation  
The observed increase in comovements of asset prices across markets and 
borders during periods of financial turmoil have historically led analysts to raise 
the hypothesis of ‘contagion’ in the international transmission of currency and 
financial shocks.  
Empirical literature shows that periods of crisis coincide with a high covariance 
of returns across national markets and a high volatility of asset prices18. Moreover, 
many of these studies conclude that the correlation between market returns is 
higher19 during periods of turmoil. 
Nevertheless, interpreting any increase in cross-country covariances or correlations 
purely as evidence of contagion may be an error 20. 
One of the most recurrent approaches to this issue is to define contagion in 
opposition to interdependence.  
Contagion then occurs “if cross-market comovements increase significantly 
after a shock” 21. Whenever this increase is not significant, the phenomenon is seen 
as interdependence. This narrow definition has two important advantages.  Firstly, 
                                                 
17 The book International Financial Contagion edited by Claessens and Forves,Kluwer Academic 
Publishers(ISBN:0792372859) based on the World Bank conference of contagion of 1999 states all the empirical 
works on contagion and the different approach. 
18 For excellent empirical reviews refer to Pericoli and Sbracia (2001)and Claessens et al.(2001). 
19 Cosetti et al(2000b and 2001) show that in some episodes the correlation falls in the beginning of a crisis, thus, 
raises the issue of assessing the importance of country-specific factors relative to common factors as the main 
cause of market volatility during periods of turmoil. 




it provides a straightforward framework for testing if contagion occurs, based 
purely on empirical grounds.  Secondly, it avoids the need to measure directly and 





First  models of contagion and correlation. 
The standard test of contagion across stock markets measures the correlation 
coefficient of asset returns in tranquil times, and then compares it to the 
estimation of the same coefficient in the turmoil period. The hypothesis of 
contagion is accepted when the correlation coefficient increases significantly during 
the crisis. If, on the other hand, the increase cannot be taken as significant, the 
contagion hypothesis is rejected in favour of interdependence. The first major 
empirical papers22 using this approach found that there was a statistically 
significant increase in cross-market correlation coefficients during the relevant 
crises and therefore concluded that contagion occurred in the tested periods. 
The initial assumptions of this model are that the rates of return of the stock 
markets in two countries are linearly related:    = α+β +ε tt t yx ,  
  t y  is the stock market return of the country under study,  t x  is the stock market 
return of the country related and εtis a independent stochastic noise ( ε= t E( ) 0 , 
ε= tt E(x ) 0 ) while α  andβ  are constants. 
The tool generally used to measure contagion was the correlation coefficient: 
                                                                                                                                                       
21 Forbes and Rigobon(2002) 
22 King and Wadhwani(1990) test for stock market correlation between U.S., U.K. and Japan , Lee and Kim(1993) ) 
test for stock market correlation in the 12 major markets, Calvo and Reinhart(1996)test for stock prices and Brady 
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If  ρ  increases significantly in crisis periods (due to an increase of  ) Var(xt or an 
increase of β , or both) they state that there is evidence of contagion. 
The empirical results for the studies using these models show that contagion 
occurred to several countries during the 1997 Asian crisis, the 1994 Mexican 
devaluation, and the 1987 U.S. market crash.  
I have run a standard test for the East Asian 1997 crisis and found contagion 
between the returns of four currencies23. 
 
Rigobon and Forbes(2002) ’No contagion, just interdependence’ model 
A new wave of studies24 focused on proving that the previous tests were biased 
upwards. Cross-market correlation coefficients are by definition conditional on 
market volatility; during crises, estimated correlation coefficients tend to increase. 
A significant increase in the correlation expression shown above (assuming β , the 
measure of the `strength’ of the link between the two markets, does not change), 
could be provoked just by an increase of  ) Var(xt , that is consistent with a stable 
international transmission of financial shocks. They do not necessarily reflect 
discontinuities in the transmission mechanisms, and therefore this significant 
increase of ρ  could be just interdependence. Thus, the early test and its definition 
of contagion failed, from the point of view of this new approach, to identify whether 
there has been contagion or not. They also showed that, under certain 
assumptions, it is possible to specify the magnitude of this bias and correct for it. 
                                                 
23 Appendix 1 shows my findings with two correlation matrix between the retuns of the currencies. 




After adjusting for the magnitude of the bias, these tests based on the 
unconditional correlation rejected the hypothesis of contagion.  
Their proof of that argument is simplified below: 
Given the model     =α+β +ε tt t yx  and   ε =ε < ε = β <
2
tt t t E( ) 0 E( ) 0 E(x ) 0 1 
The sample is divided into two subsamples, l (tranquil period) and h (turbulence 
period), with different variances σ >σ
hl
xxx x .  
By ε= tt E(x ) 0 assumption  OLS β  is a consistent and efficient estimator of β  and 
therefore as  β= β








, which implies that    σ> σ
hl
xyx y  
The covariance of the turmoil period (h) is higher than the one corresponding to a 
tranquil period. 
Through the assumptions that  ε <
2
t E( )  ∞ and constant, and  β <1 they find 




















ρ 〉 ⇒ = =  that confirm their hypothesis of biased 
tests. 
The corrected model by Forbes and Rigobon(2001) posit once again a linear 
relationship between rates of returns in country x and y:    =α+β +ε tt t yx  
Assuming no endogeneity or omitted variables25 ( 0 ) , ( = t t x Corr ε  and  c Var t = ) (ε ), 











                                                 
25 In Appendix B of Forbes and Rigobon(2002)analyse the impact of relaxing this restrictive assumptions.  




δ is the relative increase in the variance of x (a measure of market volatility) and 
can be expressed as: 







As * ρ  is increasing inδ and markets tend to be more volatile after a crisis (which 
increases  δ ),  * ρ  will increase after a shock even if ρ  (the unconditional 
correlation coefficient) is the same as during more stable periods. 
Without adjusting for the bias, in this test it is impossible to deduce if an increase 
on  * ρ  is provoked by an increase on ρ  or by an increase on δ ; by the authors’ 
definition, only an increase on ρ  constitutes contagion. 
The adjustment of the bias is expressed by:   
() []






=   
They state that this adjustment is only valid if their initial assumption27 holds, and 
admit that these suppositions are clearly a simplification. 
Their results were that, using the adjustment derived above, there was virtually no 
contagion during the 1997 Asian crisis, the 1994 Mexican devaluation, and the 
1987 U.S. market crash. 
 
Corsetti et al (2002) ‘Some Contagion, Some Interdependence’ model 
Corsetti,G, Pericoli,M and Sbracia,M (2002) followed the Rigobon et al(1999) 
approach, but attempted to be more general.  
They state a new and more accurate definition of contagion: “a structural break in 
the international transmission of financial shocks so that the observed pattern of 
comovements in asset prices is too strong relative to what can be predicted when 
the mechanism of international transmission is constant”.  
                                                 




They developed a test of contagion in financial markets, based on bivariate 
correlation analysis, that does not impose restrictions on the variance of common 
factors relative to the variance of country-specific risks.  They applied it to the 
international stock market crisis of Hong Kong in 1997. Their empirical results are 
in contrast with the findings of the preceding literature29 (according to which there 
is ‘no contagion, only interdependence”) as they found contagion in some of the 
cases.  They argue that the result of the other authors is very extreme due to 
unnecessary restrictions on the variance of the market specific noise in the country 
where the crisis originates. This approach is a more general model in which some 
of the assumptions of Rigobon and Forbes model30 are relaxed. 
They choose a standard single-factor model as a data-generating process of 
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where f is a common factor that represents the global effect. Calculating the 
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29 Rigobon and Forbes(2002) 
30 The test is interpreted by their authors as an extension of the theorem in Boyer et al.(1999) to the case of a more 
general structure of the  ) , ( j i r r Cov and  ) ( i r Var   




The main assumptions of this model are that  εi f,  and εj are mutually independent 
( ε= ε= ε ε= ij i j E(f ) 0 E(f ) 0 E( ) 0 ) that implies:  = γγ ij i j Cov(r,r ) Var(f) 
Substituting, 
                       
γγ
ρ= =
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 ε  ε
++    γγ  
 
The explanation of an observed increase in the correlation coefficient in crisis 
periods will depend upon one’s hypothesis. 
If one takes γ jandγi as given, then the variance of factor f must increase more, 
relative to the variance of the residuals. 
If, on the other hand, one assumes that what is constant is the variance of the 
factor f, then the increment in the correlation coefficient must have been caused by 
an increase in the coefficients γ jandγi. 
From the authors’ perspective, in this distinction lies the key for distinguishing 
between interdependence and contagion phenomena. 
Accordingly, this constitutes the premise in which their empirical approach is 
based. 
Consider a financial crisis in a given country j. The increase in the variance of the 
rate of return  j r  (an increase in its volatility) may be caused by an increase on the 
variance of f, the variance of de  j ε , or both. 
2




If the ratio  j Var( )/Var(f) ε  decreases because the variance of f increases more than 
the variance of the noise term  j ε , this results in an increased correlation 
coefficient; 
     
jj 2
j
Var(r ) Var( )
Var(f) Var(f)
ε
=γ +  
This change in the correlation is interdependence, in the sense that it is the 
global factor f that provokes, by an increase in its variance, the increase in the 
correlation coefficient. 
On the other assumption, contagion occurs when the increment in correlation 
is due to a change that is more powerful than the one that can be caused by the 
behavioural equations of the model. 
Summarising, contagion takes place when some country-specific shock 
expands to a regional or even global level. It can be modelled by assuming that an 
η factor exists, equal to nil during quiet periods and positive during crises. It can 






=α +γ + η+η
      
(with j β  normalized to unit). 
-In the interdependency case,  i 0 β =  where the data generating process is the 
same as before, with  jj ε= η + η  
-Contagion occurs when  i 0 β≠ . From this hypothesis it turns out that the 
interdependence contrast is carried out by testing the hypothesis of   i 0 β= . 
By re-analysing conditional correlation coefficients we can make this operative in 
order to contrast interdependence or contagion. 
Supposing that some critical event has been identified,  let δ be the change in the 




jj Var(r /C) (1 )Var(r ) =+ δ      where C means  “crisis in country j” 
To test whether the changes in the correlation coefficient between  i r and j r  are 
consistent with the data generating process, we need to specify an interdependency 
measure, under the hypothesis that  i j ii j ,, V a r () , y C o v (,) γγ ε εε are invariant with 
respect to crisis in country j. 
Under this assumptions, the correlation coefficient between  i r and j r  can be 
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with  C










As we can see, the parameter Φ is a function of  C
jj ,, , λ λδ  and ρ.  The correlation 
coefficient  C ρ  (measured in crisis periods), and the theoretical interdependency 
measureΦ 33 are the main elements of the authors’ test. 
The major theoretical findings of this model are that if 
i j i ,, V a r () γγ εand i j Cov( , ) εε do not change during crisis periods, then  C ρ  and Φ, 
must be equal.  On the contrary, if  C ρ  is bigger than Φ, contagion occurs (shown 
by an increase of  i γ ,  j γ  or  i j Cov( , ) ε ε ). 
The tested hypothesis is:     
C
0 H: ρ≤ Φ ⇒interdependence  
                                                 




      Against   C
1 H: ρ >Φ⇒contagion. 
The authors calculated two-day rolling averages (to avoid the problem of non 
simultaneity of the international markets) of daily returns in US dollars. 
The sample used to test the tranquil episode covers the period from 1/01/1997 to 
17/10/1997 and, on the other hand, from 20/10/1997 to 30/11/1997 for the 
crisis period of Hong-Kong. 
In their empirical results they found evidence that 1997 Hong Kong stock market 
crisis was contagious to markets in Singapore, Philippines, France, Italy and the 
UK. 
 
Dungey et al (2002) ‘Contagion, Currency crisis’GARCH models 
  The work of Dungey, M and Martin,V (2002) tries to address the problems 
that arise from the restrictive assumptions of homoskedasticity of the errors and 
the simplification to one unique common factor f in the above models, by giving 
some structure to the errors and adding a number of explanatory variables. 
Its starting point is a new definition of contagion that is identified as the 
“transmission of unanticipated country specific idiosyncratic shocks on 
neighbouring countries after conditioning on both common and country specific 
fundamentals”.  This implies that one can distinguish between common shocks, 
country specific shocks and contagion (as defined in part one).  They tried to factor 
all potential contagion channels amongst countries into their empirical application 
of the model.  
According to the authors, their model has two main advantages over current 
alternatives.  Firstly, the data requirements are less stringent (exchange rate data 
                                                                                                                                                       
33 Notice that the measure of independence derived by Rigobon et al.  * ρ  and the one derived by Cosetti et al. 
Φ coincide when  0 = =
C
j j λ λ , this shows that the Rigobon model is one particular case of the Cosetti model, 




can be obtained easily for high frequencies).  Secondly, many of the supposed 
empirical characteristics of exchange rates such as unit roots, cointegration to 
express long-run relationships and GARCH variances to capture the time-varying 
conditional volatility35, were included. 
To relax the underlying assumptions, the expansion possibilities of their model 
follow two paths.  Firstly, they undertake a characterisation of the residuals, giving 
some type of stochastic structure different than white noise (i.e. 
2
i,t 1/t i0 i1 t i1 i,t/t 1 hh +− =α +α ε +β ). 
Secondly, they modify the common factor f by giving some specific structure and 
increasing the number of common factors. 
The new approach looked for contagion in the framework of the 1997 Asian 
currency crisis and takes as the main aim of the analysis the relationship between 
the returns of four exchange rates (South Korea, Indonesia, Thailand and 
Malaysia).  
The ‘latent factor’ model is developed for the standardized variables t i Z , , which 








Where  t i S , represent the exchange rate of the country i at time t relative to the US 
dollar.  i µ and  i V  are the sample mean and standard deviation of  it S ln .The aim of 
the ‘normalization’ is to get a common scale for all exchange rates.  
The model assumes a linear relationship between observed  t i Z ,  and four 
unobserved components, assuming also that these components are independent  
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As an example let us see the specification of the model for the variable i=2: 
2t 2 t t 2 2t 21 1t 23 3t 24 4t ZV F Cee e = λ+ θ + σ + δ + δ + δ  
where  t V and  t F  are factors that represent common shocks (i.e. affecting all 
countries).  The first one is called “variable shock” because the same shock can 
have different impacts,  i λ , in each country.  The second is referred to as the “fixed 
shock”, arising from the exchange rates being expressed in terms of a common 
numeraire currency, and affecting them all by the same impact θ .  Each exchange 
rate is affected by a idiosyncratic shock,  t i C , , that is unique to a specific country 
with an impact given by  i σ  that is related with the variance of this shock, as we 
see below. Finally, a random variable vector , t j e ,  , is used to model the effect of 
shocks (contagion) that affect one country j idiosyncratically, and can be 
transmitted to country i.  The impact of each shock is measured by j i, δ . 
The authors consider that the different unobserved component variables are 
defined by the behavioural equations stated below: 
tt 1 V t V t V t V t V t
2
V t V V V V t1 V V t1





=− α− β+ α + β
 
 
tt 1 F t F t F t F t F t
2
F t F F F F t1 F F t1





=− α− β+ α + β
 
 




The model contains 29 parameters and so the estimation procedures can 
become complicated. They follow the simulation procedures of some authors36, 
implementing a indirect estimator involving the simulation of the latent factor 
model and the matching of the characteristics of the simulated exchange rates with 
the observed exchange rates via an auxiliary model, whose likelihood function is 
approximated by four types of moment conditions37. 
The empirical results show statistically significant contagion effects in the Asian 
currency crisis among the four economies in question, and provide evidence on the 
direction of transmission and the relative importance of contagion for individual 
countries in the region. 
 
4.Criticisms of the models 
 
Two related topics arise when trying to identify the consistency of the studies 
that measure contagion by correlation test: the validation of the test itself and the 
validation of the model that supports the test. 
 
To approach the first topic, the validation of the test itself, I evaluate the 
criticisms stated in the literature. 
 
To asses the second topic I raise a natural question: Does the data support the 
model in tranquil periods? The answer to this question is vital in order to continue 
with the testing procedure: if it is negative then the result of the test will not be 
consistent;  furthermore it can be misleading. 
 
                                                 
36 Fourieroux and Monfort and Renault (1993,1995), Gallant and Tauchen(1996), Duffie and Singleton(1993) 




A.The Test  
 
The most important technical problem that affects all tests of contagion using 
correlation analysis is the intrinsically low power of the test.  The power of the test 
depends on the sample size, and the ‘crisis’ period contains relatively few 
observations compared with the ‘tranquil’ period. 
Dungey and Zhumabekova (1999) proved that the result of Forbes and Rigobon 
on contagion from the 1987 U.S. stock market crash, generally rejecting the 
hypothesis of contagion, is due to the comparison of a large sample ‘no crisis’ 
period, with a small sample ‘crisis’ period. 
The Fisher transformation38 on the calculated correlation coefficient is required to 











asymptotically distributed as a normal random variable39, and this result is best 
suited for sample sizes >5040.  
However, Rigobon applies the Fisher test to incomparable subsamples in the 
1987 U.S.stock market crash above mentioned. This test is undertaken between 
non-turmoil periods of 466 observations41 and turmoil periods of as few as 35 
observations42. 
The authors carry out Monte Carlo experiments in testing correlations, simulating 
populations of bivariate normal observations.  For given correlation matrices, the 
correlation coefficients are statistically different for the two populations at 1% level 
of significance.  The aim of this experiment is to investigate the impact of the 
                                                 

















s as the 
standard deviation where  i n is the size of the sample and given this transformation the two –sample test on 
independent means is performed. 
39 Anderson, 1984, pag.123-124 and Stuart y Ord (1991,1994) 
40 Kendall y Stuart, 1979 




sample size in the result of the correlation coefficient standard test (where 
interdependence is the null hypothesis).  They find that with reasonably sized 
samples the ability to produce reliable estimates of the true correlation coefficients 
and their standard errors is acceptable.  As the sample size declines, however, the 
estimates of the standard errors are seriously affected because the test has very 
little power, and so the ability to reject the null hypothesis is somewhat limited. 
They conclude by cautioning against using Forbes and Rigobon’s approach of 
identifying contagious episodes. 
As the Rigobon model is a specific case43 of Corsetti´s model, most of the 
criticisms for Corsetti´s model also apply to Rigobon´s, and vice versa. 
I must highlight that the critics above explained for Rigobon can be applied to 
Cosseti´s as they uses as well Fisher transformation for . non-turmoil periods of 
146 observations44 and turmoil periods of only 22 observations45.for the test of 
contagion of 1997 Hong Kong stock market crash. 
The original nature of a financial crisis clearly implies that it takes place within a 
small amount of time (2-3 weeks) and so a small amount of data can be collected 
within that period.  If the decrease in asset prices, the change in the exchange rate 
and the other consequences of a crisis happen in a relatively long period of time, 
we would not call that a crisis but a slowdown of the economy and it has not the 
same drastic consequences. 
So if we try to compensate for the lack of necessary data by including more 
observations, we would smooth the impact of the crisis and the result would be 
even more inaccurate. 
                                                                                                                                                       
4217Oct1987 to 4Dec1987 
43 Notice that the measure of independence derived by Rigobon et al.  * ρ  and the one derived by Cosetti et al. 
Φ coincide when  0 = =
C
j j λ λ . 
44 1Jan1997 to17Oct1997 




 The intrinsic nature of this phenomenon goes against the requirements of the 
Fisher test and a good many statistical properties. This may indicate that we 




 Rigobon and previous studies assume that the asset returns of one country only 
depend on the asset returns of another country.  Of course, this simplification does 
not hold in the data during ‘non crisis’ periods.  The error, if  t X and  t Y are 
stationary series, would absorb all omitted variables, making it heteroskedastic. 
This affirmation is supported by empirical studies that also support the evidence 
that assets returns have always high volatility. 
 
The main hypothesis of Corsetti´s model laid on the existence of a common factor 
that determines the behaviour of the returns of all the assets. That latent factor is 
assimilated to an average of the market indexes of the G-7 or a world capital 
market index. In general, an extension of the property of the model to the rest of 
the markets –an Index of the exchange rates, for example— would be desirable.  
 
The series of returns of financial assets (shares, exchange rates, etc.) frequently 
shows evidence of heteroskedasic behaviour. The GARCH models are, in many 
cases, quite appropriate to capture this special behaviour.  But as before, the 
pertinence of the model used must be tested regarding the sample evidence. For 
that reason I checked the statistical properties of the data of the Dungey, M and 
Martin,V (2002) empirical analysis. 
The authors’ behavioural hypothesis of the South Korean won, the Indonesian 




that the four of them follow a GARCH(1,1) process46.  This finding allows them to 
justify the specification of the structure of the two unobservable common factors of 
their model ( t V and  t F ,) 
I have tested the hypothesis of GARCH(1,1) with the data47 in the same period that 
the authors, and found that an increased structure is also accepted by the data. 
The general structure of a GARCH(p,q) process is: 











i t i 0 t h h  
I have estimated all the combinations (GARCH(1,1), GARCH(1,2),GARCH(2,1) and 
GARCH(2,2)) for the following expression: 




1 1 0 − − − − + + + + = t t t t t h h h β β ε α ε α α      (1) 
and I have found different structure specifications for all the currencies. These 
results are summarized in table 1. 
Table1. Maximum likelihood parameter estimates models in equation (1) for alternative 
countries, 3rd of June 1997 to 30th of August 1998 (E-VIEWS)  Z-statistics in brackets. 
Country   
Parameter 
South Korea  Indonesia  Thailand  Malaysia 
































2 β   NA NA NA NA 
Model GARCH(1,2)  GARCH(1,2) GARCH(1,2) GARCH(1,2) 
 
                                                 
46 See table 2 of Dungey et al.(2002)   





With these new specifications of the data structure, it would be desirable to find 
out to what extent they may also change the specification of the common factors of 
the model, and therefore the final outcome of the contagion test.  
 
I must also highlight that when the model tries to be more realistic or more 
general as in the Dungey et al.(2002) approach, the number of parameters grows 
and so does the possibility of inclusions of non linear relationships. The price to 
pay for the generalization is then the increased difficulty of estimation and the 
inaccuracy of the estimated parameters.  This also raises the well-known problems 
of model identification, robustness or consistency in estimation,  as well as 
goodness of fit. 
The overparametrization of the model implies that any small change in the sample 
period which significantly alters the properties of the data can lead to large 
changes in the estimated parameters and therefore in the diagnostic of contagion. 
        I have tested the robustness of the model related to changes in the sample 
period by adding a further 186 observations at the end of the period48.  I have 
found that none of the relevant currencies follow either the GARCH(1,1) model 
suggested by the authors or my own GARCH(1,2) model (see Table 2).  This could 
imply that the behavioural hypothesis of the currencies are not consistent along 
the time period, and therefore the specification of the common factors of the model 





                                                 
48 The initial values of the sample can be easily justified by the beginning of the Thailand crisis (June1997). 
However, in my opinion, there is no clear criterion for the selection of the end of the sample, and any decision in 




Table2. Maximum likelihood parameter estimates models in equation (1) for alternative 
countries, 3rd of June  1997 to 31st of January 1998 (E-VIEWS) Z-statistics in brackets. 
Country   
Parameter 
South Korea  Indonesia  Thailand  Malaysia 
















2 α   NA  -0.366893 
(-4.853000) 
-0.449537 
(-4.736755)  NA 








2 β   0.447837 
(6.523101)  NA NA  -0.590828 
(-1.0E+102) 
Model GARCH(2,1)  GARCH(1,2) GARCH(1,2) GARCH(2,1) 
 
Apart from the above concerns surrounding data specification and robustness, I 
find another main concern related with the standardized values of the exchange 








=   
It is a normal feature that the time series data of exchange rates suffer a sharp 
structural  break of the stationary property at the beginning of a financial crisis. 
Thus,  t i S , exchange rate series are non stationary49, and neither are their 
logarithms in the period under study: it does not meet the first condition for a 
standardization (mean must be stationary).  What is, then, the meaning of  i µ ? It 
cannot be estimated, and so it has no meaning: it is just calculated as the 
arithmetic mean of the data. The same problem arises for the calculation of the 
standard deviation  i σ . 
The standardization is justified by the authors as it helps them to circumvent 




different magnitudes.  But even then, they find hugely atypical values, and so  t i Z , is 
as well non stationary50. 
If  t i Z , helps to standardise the scale to achieve the normalization of virulent 
changes, one ought to inquire the extent to which this transformation is neutral, 
related to the contagion test. 
Another concern is that the modelling of  t i Z , variables has many ad hoc 
restrictions that will affect the final results of the test, and so I will comment on 
their consistency. 
The problem of choosing explanatory variables is more acute when the factors are 
unobservable, as occurs in this case. 
We can see by the model specification stated in section 2, that it has two ad hoc 
common factors  t V and  t F , each of which is supposed to follow a random walk 
process with a GARCH(1,1) errors structure as discussed above.  They have to 
impose an arbitrary initial value of  t V and  t F  for the random walk, as these 
variables are unobservable. The model also has a country-specific factor ( t i C , ) that, 
by assumption, follows an Autoregressive process. 
Some of these assumptions make most of the variance of  t i Z ,  explainable by the 
variances of  t V and  t F  (absorbed by the GARCH process of its residuals) and so less 
of this variance is explained by the residuals of the model itself.  That can imply 
less contagion evidence. 
The whole model is plagued by questionable ad hoc restrictions.  For example: why 
do they not specify just one common factor that absorbs all the GARCH behaviour 
of the returns? Why must the country specific factor follow an autoregressive 
process and not, for example, a moving average process instead? 
                                                                                                                                                       







Critiques concerning the low power of tests51 apply to the work of Forbes & 
Rigobon and that of Corsetti, since both of these use results based on asymptotic 
distributions. Corsetti attempts to generalise Forbes & Rigobon’s model, although it 
constitutes essentially the same methodology, based on contrasting changes in the 
estimated correlation coefficient in two different samples.  The sample drawn from 
the crisis period will invariably have fewer data.   
 
Concerning the use of GARCH or any alternative models, one ought 
simultaneously to contrast the model’s validity in order adequately to represent the 
behaviour of the data.  My empirical research of that aspect has shown, firstly, that 
the GARCH structure can be increased at little cost (which sheds some doubt on 
the model’s ultimate specification).  Secondly, these model specifications lack 
robustness.  
 
The main idea that I must highlight is that there is a great challenge, previous 
to modelling, when the appropriate model is not known. The main, as yet 
unanswered, question concerns the conceptual and theoretical model that correctly 
describes the determination of the prices of those financial assets whose contagion 
effects one is trying to measure.  The models by Forbes & Rigobon and Corsetti are 
gross simplifications of an extremely complex phenomenon. The model by Dungey 
et al., on the other hand, attempts greater generality, but is unfortunately plagued 
with ad hoc restrictions.  
                                                                                                                                                       
50 See  figure 2. Dungey et al.(2002)   





There are different measures of association or linkage among random variables 
in existence; the coefficient of lineal correlation is not the only one. Other 
association measures can be taken into account, especiallyregarding nonlinear 
phenomena, leading to very different conclusions.   
 
The models in question fail to cover the main problem of clarifying the 
concept of contagion.  When it is stated in some model that a given period was or 
was not characterised by contagion (as defined in the model itself), there does not 
seem to be much progress made either in understanding the phenomenon or in 
suggesting measures to curb the problem accruing to investors and policymakers.   
While the analogy may be suggestive, attempting to measure an effect whose 
theoretical identification is as yet unsatisfactory may prove a sterile course of 
action.  In this sense surveys on contagion (like that of Dornbusch et al) come to 
the fore, in which there is a discussion of a variety of channels and factors that 
theoretically explain the issue.  These are in sharp contrast with the articles 
considered in this paper, where contagion is reduced to a simple correlation test. 
 
There are a number of unresolved informational issues concerning market 
microstructure that are important in any consistent research of the subject, as 
other studies52 have also conclude. Such information could help identify 
characteristics that make countries vulnerable to contagion and could contribute 
to the development of specific policy prescriptions to reduce the risks of contagion 






Appendix 1  
I have estimated the sample correlation between the returns of South 
Korean won, Indonesian Rupiah, Thailand Bath and Malaysian Ringgitt in two 
periods.  
M y  a i m  i s  t o  s h o w  t h a t  b y  r u n n i n g  a  standard correlation test (without the 
suggested adjustment for the upwards bias)  between financial asses(returns of 
exchange rates) it is easily to check whether this coefficient has significantly 
increased or not. 
I summarize my findings in the two correlation matrix tables below.  
Data source: http://pacific.commerce.ubc.ca/xr 
Non Crisis sample:2 January 96 – 30 May 97 
    South Korea  Indonesia  Thailand  Malaysia 
    WON RUPIAH  BATH  RINGGITT 
South Korea  WON  1  -0.001616 0.027252 -0.040233 
Indonesia  RUPIAH  -0.001616 1 0.114782  -0.055727 
Thailand  BATH  0.027252 0.114782  1  -0.018781 
Malaysia  RINGGITT  -0.040233 -0.055727 -0.018781  1 
 
Crisis sample:2 June 97 – 30 August 98 
    South Korea  Indonesia  Thailand  Malaysia 
    WON RUPIAH  BATH  RINGGITT 
South Korea  WON  1 0.111085  0.081615  0.111249 
Indonesia  RUPIAH  0.111085 1 0.530289  0.471916 
Thailand  BATH  0.081615 0.530289  1  0.382979 
Malaysia  RINGGITT  0.111249 0.471916 0.382979  1 
                                                                                                                                                       




So by a simple overview of these two tables we can reject the null hypothesis of 
interdependence ( : 0 H crisis nocrisis ρ ρ = ) and thus conclude that by the standard test of 
correlation we would accept the hypothesis of contagion for the East Asian crisis of 1997. 
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